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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 31, 1992, the U.S. Secretary of Transportation announced a new policy in
negotiating bilateral air transport agreements (BATAs).' BATAs describe the rights and
privileges through which two countries regulate their international civil aviation
relationship.2 The first BATA to incorporate the new Open Skies policy is the U.S.-
Netherlands Air Service Agreement of September 4, 1992 (Open Skies accord)
This Comment creates a context for thoroughly analyzing the Open Skies accord. Part
I first sketches a brief history of the present BATA regime.4 Part II analyzes the terms of
the Definition Order, and describes it in the context of the present European aviation
market.5 Part III considers each provision of the Open Skies accord through the historical
development of similar provisions in other significant BATAs. 6 Among the historically
significant agreements discussed below is the U.S.-U.K. Air Service Agreement of February
11, 1946 (Bermuda 1),7 which became the model BATA well into the 1970s.8 Another
significant BATA to which the Open Skies accord is compared is Bermuda I's 1978
replacement, the Agreement on Air Transport Services, U.S.-U.K., July 23,1977 (Bermuda
11).9 Finally, Open Skies is compared with the U.S.-Netherlands Air Transport Agreement
of April 3, 1957 (the Agreement)," and its replacement, the Protocol Relating to the
Agreement of March 31, 1978 (the Protocol)." Part IV concludes by raising questions
regarding the potential ramifications of Open Skies-type agreements with other European
countries in light of the denationalization of the European Economic Community (EEC)
aviation market.12
1. Dept. of Trans. Order No. 92-8-13 (Aug. 5, 1992). In the matter of defining "Open Skies"; Final
Order [hereinafter Definition Order], available in LExas, Tran Library, Dotcab File.
2. NIcHoLS MATEFSCO MATrE, TREATISB ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAw 230 (1981).
3. Memorandum of Consultations, September 1-4, 1992, United States-Netherlands (on rile with The
Transnational Lawyer). Throughout this Comment, the terms "Open Skies" or "Open Skies accord" will refer
to the U.S.-Netherlands Open Skies accord of September 4, 1992. The terms "Open Skies Definition" or "Open
Skies policy" will refer to the Department of Transportation (DOT) Definition Order which established a
definition for Open Skies-type BATAs.
4. See infra notes 13-40 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 41-78 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 79-262 and accompanying text.
7. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
United Kingdom Relating to Air Services Between Their Respective Territories, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.K.,
T.1.A.S. No. 1507 [hereinafter Bermuda 1]. For an extensive discussion of Bermuda I, see generally MATra,
supra note 2, at 230-35; PAuL S. DEmPsEY, LAW AND FOREON PoucY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 9, 13-17,
53-57 (1987); Barry R. Diamond, The Bermuda Agreement Revisited: A Look at the Past, Present and Future
of Bilateral Air Transport Agreements, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 419 (1975).
8. DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 15.
9. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of t1le
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Air Services, Jul. 23, 1977, U.S.-U.K., 28
U.S.T. 5368, T.I.A.S. 1641 [hereinafter Bermuda 11].
10. Air Transport Agreement, Apr. 3, 1957, U.S.-Neth., 12 U.S.T. 837, T.I.A.S. 4782 [hereinafter the
Agreement].
11. Protocol Relating to the Agreement, Mar. 31, 1978,29 U.S.T. 3088, T.1.A.S. 8998 [hereinafter the
Protocol].
12. See infra notes 263-83 and accompanying text.
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A. Historical Development of the BATA Regime
The present BATA regime originated during the Chicago Conference of 1944, where
52 nations created the Convention on International Civil Aviation1 3 (Chicago
Convention).1 4 As the most powerful aviation nation following World War II, the U.S.
wanted the Chicago Convention to create an unrestricted, multilateral regime to govern
international air transport.'" The Chicago Convention drafters initially attempted to govern
international aviation on a multilateral basis."
The current BATA regime is a result of the Chicago Convention's failure to reach a
multilateral exhange of traffic rights. 7 Because of that failure, the Chicago Conference
adopted a Form of Standard Agreement of Provisional Air Routes (Standard Form) as an
essentially structural model for future BATAs." The Standard Form never became the
model envisioned by the Chicago Conference. 9 Instead, in 1946 the two most powerful
aviation nations, the U.S. and the U.K., signed Bermuda I, a liberal and unrestrictive BATA,
which remained the model agreement for almost thirty years.2 ' Bermuda I contained the
Bermuda Principles, which established "fair and equal opportunities" for the carriers of the
two nations to "operate" on any route.21 In other words, the Bermuda Principles called for
equal exchanges of economic benefits between carriers, which required U.S. BATA
negotiators to seek exchanges of operating rights having approximately equal market
value 2 Once two BATA Contracting Parties agreed on an exchange of operating rights,
the Bermuda Principles left most operating decisions to the air carriers, with only minimum
ex post facto control by both governments.23 The Bermuda Principles represented a
compromise between a desire for freedom of commercial activity and a desire for the
protection of national civil aviation interests.2
13. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944,T.I.A.S. 1591,15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter
Chicago Convention].
14. DIEMPsEYsupra note 7. Since the Chicago Convention, over 1,500 BATAs have been signed between
each pair of nations exchanging international civil aviation. MATr', supra note 2, at 230 & n.9. Including
confidential and other non-reported agreements, the total may be nearer 2,500. Id. at n.9.
15. DENIPsEY, supra note 7, at 11.
16. For an excellent background of the negotiation and adoption of the Chicago Convention, see generally
DEmP SEY, supra note 7, at 9-13; MATIE, supra note 2, at 125-30.
17. MATra, supra note 2 at 125-30. See DEastY, supra note 7, at 12 (noting failure of Chicago
Convention to create a comprehensive economic policy or an exchange of air traffic rights).
18. DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 52. Among its provisions were route descriptions, carrier designation,
airline ownership and control, and non-discrimination regarding airport charges and customs exemptions. Joseph
Z. Gertler, Obsolescence of Bilateral Air Transport Agreements: A Problem and a Challenge, 13 ANNALS Ant
& Sp. L. 39, 43 (1988).
19. DE PsEY, supra note 7, at 52.
20. Id. at 15. See id. at 57 (stating that part of the reason for extensive adherence to the Bermuda I model
was that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. was willing to enter BATAs dissimilar to Bermuda I for most of the 30
years following 1946).
21. Final Act of Bermuda I, sec. 4, quoted in MATrE, supra note 2, at 231.
22. DEMPsEY, supra note 7, at 30.
23. I. H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 41 (1983).
24. Diamond, supra note 7, at 446.
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Following a long period characterized by liberal, unrestrictive BATAs based upon
Bermuda I, foreign negotiators began to demand more restrictive BATAs.' In the context
of the U.S.-U.K. market, U.S. interpretation of Bermuda I's liberal principles eventually
resulted in strong U.S. carriers far exceeding the traffic share of U.K. British Airways. 26
U.K. aviation authorities began feeling that the agreement was no longer serving U.K.
interests.27 The eventual response was U.K. denunciation of Bermuda I and negotiation
of a restrictive new U.S.-U.K. BATA, Bermuda II, in 1977.23
In the late 1970s, the Carter administration began to deregulate the U.S. aviation
industry, and attempted to deregulate international aviation through the adoption of new,
liberal BATAs .2  By signing liberal BATAs, the U.S. unilaterally exported its
procompetitive philosophy." Among the strategies was a U.S. policy of trading access to
lucrative interior U.S. points (hard rights) for vague promises of pricing flexibility and
prohibitions against anticompetitive behavior (soft rights).31 While the Carter
administration treated BATA negotiations as an opportunity to expand its procompetitive
philosophy to additional markets, foreign parties were bargaining for economic advantages
for their carriers.3 2 In 1978, the U.S. signed BATAs pursuant to the Carter administration
policies with several countries, including the Netherlands.33 These agreements are called
Benelux-type 4 BATAs.
B. U.S. Advantages Under the Existing BATA Regime
The current 13ATA regime has actually served U.S. interests quite well. 35 In
negotiating BATAs, the U.S. has a structural advantage in its numerous attractive aviation
25. See generally, DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 21-22 (noting the expansion of foreign-flag carriers,
operating for reasons other than profit, which dramatically increased competition with foreign carriers on
transatlantic routes).
26. MATrE, supra note 2, at 236.
27. See generally Harriet Oswalt Hill, Comment, Bermuda 11: The British Revolution of 1976,44 J. AIR
L. & COM. 111, 114-16 (1978); Linda A. Mabry, Comment, Bermuda 2: A New Model For International Air
Service Agreements, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1259, 1263-65 (1979) (for a thorough analysis of the Bermuda
I BATA).
28. Mabry, supra note 27, at 1259. "Bermuda II is primarily about restricting market access[, and is] far
more restrictive than any other BATA to which the U.S. is a party." Andrew H. Card, Jr., Secretary of
Transportation, Address to the Wings Club, New York City, New York, at 5 (September 16, 1992) (on file with
The Transnational Lawyer).
29. See generally DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 23-46, 77-91; Paul S. Dempsey, Turbulence in the "Open
Skies": The Deregulation oflnternationalAir Transport, 15 TRANSP. L. J. 305 (1987) (discussing U.S. aviation
deregulation during the Carter administration).
30. DEwPs ', supra note 7, at 31. A contemporary European commentator called U.S. policy "nothing
but arrogance on the part of U.S. policymakers who seriously planned to coerce, albeit by passive means, other
nations of the world into adoption of the U.S. policy." Dempsey, supra, note 29, at 342, quoting Majid, Recent
U.S. Aviation Policy: Need for Multilateralism Emphasized, 1984 CrTY op LONDON L. REV. 51, 62 (1984).
31. DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 77.
32. Id. at 232.
33. Id. at 31-32. The U.S.-Netherlands BATA signed in 1978 was the Protocol, the immediate precursor
to Open Skies. The Protocol, supra note 11.
34. So named because the Netherlands and Belgium were the first to enter procompetitive BATAs with
the U.S. Id. at 31.
35. Jeffrey N. Shane, Challenges in International Civil Aviation Negotiations, Address Before the Wings
Club (Feb. 26, 1988), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BuLL., at 28 (Jun. 1988).
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destinations.3 6 Additionally, U.S. deregulation and industry consolidation have resulted in
the dominance of only five airlines, called mega-carriers. 37 The mega-carriers developed
extensive "hub-and-spoke" systems that replaced point-to-point service on low ield routes
with service via a few major hubs.35 Passengers fly separate, smaller, aircraft on spoke
routes from outlying points, then board wide-body aircraft for service from the hub.39 U.S.
carriers can therefore offer service from Europe to an American hub, with further transit via
their immense spoke systems, which foreign aircraft are prohibited from doing by U.S.
cabotage laws.'
II. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OPEN SKIES POLICY
A. Definition
On March 31,1992, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) announced "a new
Department initiative... [that] would liberalize, to the maximum extent, the aviation
markets between the U.S. and Europe."4 1 On August 5, 1992, the DOT issued the
Definition Order, which defined the Open Skies policy and announced a new initiative to
negotiate Open Skies agreements with European countries.42 In the Definition Order,
Secretary of Transportation Andrew H. Card announced U.S. willingness to negotiate Open
Skies agreements with all European nations willing to permit U.S. carriers essentially free
access to their markets.4 3 The eleven-point Definition Order calls for: (1) open entry on all
routes; (2) unrestricted capacity and frequency on all routes; (3) unrestricted route and traffic
36. See id. "[A] system in which market access has to be negotiated on a bilateral reciprocal basis will
provide the greatest benefits in the long term to those with the most attractive markets, and that's us.". Id.
Taking advantage of BATAs calling for equal exchange of economic benefits has enabled U.S. negotiators to
extract considerable advantages for U.S. carriers. Paul V. Mifsud, New Proposals for New Directions: 1992 and
the GATT Approach to Trade in Air Transport Services, 13 AiR L. 154, 160 (1988).
U.S. structural negotiating advantages include the unequalled size of the U.S. domestic air transport market,
separation of air transport from other trade issues, and seeking an equal balance of benefits with BATA partners
on a nation-by-nation basis. Id. These advantages have given U.S. airlines the right to serve over 40 European
destinations, while no European carrier has similar rights in the U.S. Id. Furthermore, the U.S. has negotiated
the right to pick up European passengers and transport them within the European market, which European
carriers cannot do between destinations in the U.S. market because of cabotage restrictions. Id. Cabotage is
defined as air transport "between any two points in the territory of a State.- DmDERnIms-VEscHooR, supra note
23, at 17, quoting BIN CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL Am TRANSPORT 314 (1962). Both U.S. law and
the Chicago Convention bar foreign carrier cabotage rights in the U.S. See 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. 1508(b) (Law.
Co-op. 1990); Chicago Convention, supra note 13, art. 7 (prohibiting cabotage).
But see DnimpsEY, supra note 7, at 81-82 (describing U.S. carrier structural disadvantages, including
governmental ownership or subsidy of foreign-flag carriers, making profitable operation less critical for survival).
37. George Petsikas, "Open Skies" - North America, 17 ANNALS Am & SP. L. 281, 284 (1992). The
carriers are American Airlines, United Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines and USAir. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See generally, H.A. Wassenbergh, International Air Transport: Regulatory Approaches in the
Nineties, 17 Am & Sp. L 68, 71 (1992) (describing the advantages created by combining domestic networks
and transatlantic trunk routes in the same U.S. carriers).
41. Department of Transportation Order No. 92-4-53 (May 5, 1992) (defining "Open Skies"); Order
Requesting Comments, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,323 (1992).
42. Definition Order, supra note 1, at 1.
43. Id.
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rights;4 (4) double-disapproval pricing45 and price leadership in third country markets;46
(5) application of the least restrictive charter regulations of the two governments;47 (6) a
liberal cargo regime;48 (7) conversion and remittance arrangements; 49 (8) open code-
sharing opportunities;" (9) self-handling provisions; 1 (10) procompetitive provisions on
commercial opportunities, user charges,52 fair competition, and intermodal flights;-3 and
(11) an explicit commitment for nondiscriminatory operation of and access for computer
reservation systems (CRSs).5'
Many U.S. and European commentators find it significant that the Definition Order does
not include a position on cabotage" or ownership and control provisions.56 The DOT
feels these matters are best discussed in the context of each bilateral exchange on a case-by-
case basis.57 European critics have addressed U.S. retention of cabotage restrictions.5 8
American criticism, on the other hand, concerns the possibility that the Open Skies policy
will weaken U.S. national ownership and control rules. 9
44. Rights include the right to operate service between any point in the U.S. and any point in the
European country, including unrestricted intermediate and beyond points, change of gauge, or the right to carry
fifth freedom traffic. Definition Order, supra note 1, at 3. See infra note 238 (describing the five freedoms of
international aviation, and specifically defining the fifth freedom as the right to fly between the territory of the
other Contracting Party and third countries).
Change of gauge means using another, usually smaller, aircraft for further transportation along one route.
H. A. Wassenbergh, New Aspects of National Aviation Policies and the Future of International Air Transport
Regulation, 13 AiR L 18, 24 (1988).
45. Double disapproval pricing means authorities of both nations must disapprove a rate before it will
be disallowed. Richard W. Bogosian, Aviation Negotiations and the U.S. ModelAgreement, 46 . AIR L. & COM.
1007, 1015 (1981).
46. Price leadership in third country markets means airlines of a third country may set prices
independently of the two Contracting Parties. Bogosian, supra, note 45, at 1015 n.27. Unconditional price
leadership may present legal difficulties with EC nations, and the U.S. is prepared not to insist on it in intra-EC
markets. Definition Order, supra note 1, at 3.
47. By way of oantrast, many charter regulations contain country-of.-origin charter rules, where regulations
of the country of origin govern the flight. MATr, supra note 2, at 156 n.123.
48. As with charters, the Definition Order notes the importance of liberal charter and cargo air carriage
as essential elements of the Open Skies definition. Definition Order, supra note 1, at 4.
49. These arrangements enable carriers to convert and remit earnings in hard currency promptly and
without restrictions. Id. at 5.
50. Code sharing is defined as publishing schedules for connecting flights of two airlines under the code
of one airline. Wassenbergh, supra note 44, at 24 n.8.
51. The Definition Order defines self-handling provisions as the right of a carrier to perform and/or
control the airport functions that support its operations. Definition Order, supra note 1, at 5.
52. User charge means a charge made to the airlines for the provision of airport, air navigation, or
aviation security property or facilities. U.S. Model Agreement, art. 1, para. ('), quoted in Bogosian, supra, note
45, at 1023. The Definition Order explicitly leaves out customs clearance provisions, leaving them to be
negotiated in individual BATAs. Definition Order, supra note I, at 6.
53. The Open Sides accord defines intermodal flights as combining air transportation services with ground
transport. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 1, para (a).
54. Definition Order, supra note 1, app.
55. See Dmoinuxs-VERscHooR, supra note 23, at 17 (defining cabotage as air transport between any two
points in the territory of a State).
56. Definition Order, supra note 1, at 6.
57. Id.
58. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
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The Open Skies Definition Order encourages further development of a market-oriented
approach to BATA relationships.' The DOT is frankly and firmly committed to freer trade
in civil aviation.6 To that end, the U.S. is willing to pursue BATAs where its bilateral
partners may obtain greater economic benefits than the U.S.62
B. The European Aviation Environment
The Open Skies accord must also be considered in light of the present European aviation
environment. While the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community
(EEC) in 1957 and called for the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital, air
transport was expressly excluded.6" Only recently has the EEC begun to consider air
transportation. 64 As a result of the Single European Act,65 the EEC is moving toward a
common internal EEC aviation market. 66 The EEC plan involves gradually abolishing
BATAs between EEC member states and replacing them with a single, liberalized system.67
The EEC is also developing an external relations policy between member states and third
countries, including the gradual transfer of BATA negotiating power from member states to
the European Commission and Council of Ministers.68 Commentators suggest that EEC
institutions will take over international air transport negotiations gradually, on an ad hoe
basis.69 EEC relations with third countries would only make sense after the European air
transport market has integrated.7"
EEC reaction to the Open Skies accord includes criticism directed at U.S. retention of
cabotage restrictions. 7' The major European nations, in general, want nothing less than
60. Definition Order, supra note 1, at 2.
61. Id. The Definition Order notes that the U.S. would have been deterred from some of the most
successful agreements of the past decade had U.S. policy called for exchange of equivalent economic benefits.
Id.
62. Id. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (describing equal accrual of economic benefits in
the Bermuda Principles). For further discussion of unequal accrual of economic benefits, see generally infra
notes 135-36 and accompanying text (describing fair competition provisions in Open Skies). The DOT policy,
besides the Open Skies Definition Order, is also reflected in regulatory relief, particularly in deregulating
computer reservation systems (CRSs). Card, supra note 28, at 8. DOT rules remove barriers to the use of third
party hardware and software and enable travel agents to communicate with multiple CRS services. Id.
63. David Banowsky, Comment, Cutting Drag and Increasing Lift: How Well Will A More Competitive
EEC Air Transport Industry Fly?, 24 INT'L LAw. 179, 181, 183 (1990).
64. See, e.g., id. at 185-186; Werner F. Ebke & Georg W. Wenglorz, Liberalizing Scheduled Air
Transport Within the European Community: From the First Phase to the Second and Beyond, 19 TRANsP. L.
J. 417, 418-19 (1991); Jeffrey R. Platt, The Creation of a Community Cabotage Area in the European
Community and its Implications for the U.S. Bilateral Aviation System, 17 Am & SP. L. 183, 184-85 (1992).
65. Single European Act, 30 OJ. (L 169) 1 (1987).
66. Peter P.C. Haanappel, Recent Regulatory Developments in Europe, 16 ANNALs OF AIR & SP. L. 107,
108 (1991).
67. Id. The EEC policy also includes harmonization of certain technical and social laws in air transport
matters. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 118.
70. Id. at 119.
71. EEC transport minister Karel Van Miert claims "Community carriers are [not] going to get cabotage
rights [in the U.S.] unless we unite our efforts," quoted in David Gardner, EC To Propose Common Air Pacts,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at 2. Van Miert also desires a mandate from EEC member nations to negotiate for
cabotage rights in the U.S. at the EEC level. Dutch Gain From US Open Skies, FLicHT INT', Sept. 16, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Tran Library, Flight File.
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access to the U.S. domestic market in exchange for Open Skies agreements." Community
officials also fear that Open Skies is an attempt to hinder development of a united EEC
stance in negotiating future BATAs with the U.S.
73
The U.S. acknowledges that one reason for entering the Open Skies accord with the
Netherlands is to signal other larger European countries that they, too, can enjoy more
freedom to fly to the U.S. in exchange for signing Open Skies-type BATAs.74 This U.S.
policy is reminiscent of previous efforts to foist liberalization on BATA partners. In the late
1970s, the U.S. attempted to force the U.K into replacing Bermuda II with a Benelux-type
BATA by forming liberal BATAs with other countries in the region. 7" The U.S.-
Netherlands Open Skies accord may represent a U.S. effort similar to the "divide and
conquer" strategy of the late 1970s, where the U.S. attempted to bypass the restrictions of
Bermuda II by finding another conduit point for traffic heading to further destinations in
Europe.76
C. The Third U.S. Attempt
The Open Skies Definition Order represents the third U.S. attempt to achieve
deregulated, procompetitive air carriage in the international market. First, at the Chicago
Conference, the U.S. pushed for multilateral open skies.77 Then, following U.S. aviation
deregulation in the 1970s, the U.S. pushed for liberalized air traffic on a bilateral basis,
concluding several liberal BATAsby dropping insistence on negotiating an equal exchange
of economic benefits.78 The third attempt was the 1992 Open Skies policy. As in 1978,
the first nation to conclude a liberal BATA pursuant to the new U.S. policy was the
Netherlands.
I. THE U.S.-NETHERLANDS OPEN SKIES ACCORD
On September 4, 1992, the U.S. and the Netherlands signed the first BATA
incorporating the new U.S. Open Skies proposals.79 The Open Skies accord amends the
existing U.S.-Netherlands BATA"0 with new provisions relating to: designation and
authorization; substantial national ownership and control; safety; commercial operations,
72. Air Transport: U.S/Dutch Pact Sows the Seeds of Discontent, Eur. Rep., Sept. 12, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurrpt File.
73. EC. Guarded on U.S.-Dutch Aviation Accord, AGENcE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 7, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
74. Agis Salpukas, U.S. and Dutch Agree on a Pact to Aid Airlines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1992, at Al.
75. DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 32-33. As the U.K. refused to adopt a liberal Benelux-type BATA, the
chair of the Carter administration Civil Aeronautics Board responded, "'Let's stick it to the Brits--let's put
pressure on the Germans through Amsterdam.- Id. at 32, quoting ANTHONY SAMPSON, EMPIRES OF THE SKY:
Tm PoLITics, AND CA.RTELS OF WORLD AIRLN (1984).
76. DEmsPEY, supra note 7, at 32.
77. MATTE, supra note 2, at 128.
78. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (describing U.S. policy of exchanging hard rights for
soft rights).
79. Memorandum of Consultations, supra, note 3.
80. The Agreement, supra note 10, as amended by the Protocol, supra note 11. This Comment refers to
the portions of the previous U.S.-Netherlands BATA where the Protocol of 1978 amended the Agreement of
1957 as the Protocol. Otherwise, the unamended articles from the Agreement will be referred to as the
Agreement.
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including ground handling and conversion and remittance of currency; airport discrimination,
supplies, and user charges; fair competition; dispute resolution; current route schedule; and
charter services.81 The previous U.S.-Netherlands BATA already contained several
elements the Open Skies Definition Order considered essential for an Open Skies BATA.82
The negotiators agreed to promote a system with minimal governmental regulations to
facilitate the unrestricted flow of passengers and goods.83 However, in order to fully
liberalize their BATA and create a true Open Skies regime, the parties agreed to permit
designated carriers essentially free access to the market of the other.84 The spirit of the
Open Skies accord is to liberalize, to the maximum extent, the aviation market between the
two countries. 85
A. Air Service
Under Open Skies, the definition of "air service" includes scheduled, charter, and cargo
air carriage.86 The Protocol had first acknowledged charter air service by allowing the
Contracting Parties to designate charter airlines. 7 The Protocol had in turn broadened the
Agreement, which limited its discussion of air service to only scheduled air service.88
The Open Skies accord allows carriers to make multiple stops in the territory of the
other to pick up passengers, mail, and cargo.89 This contrasts with earlier, more restrictive
BATAs, where routes, including intermediate and beyond points, were specifically described
81. See Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt.1, para (a).
82. Id, at 1. For example, see infra notes 112-15,218-21 and accompanying text (discussing capacity and
rate provisions of Open Skies).
83. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, at 1.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. attachment B, pt. 1, para. (a). Scheduled and nonscheduled, or charter, aviation were considered
separately in the Chicago Convention. MATrE, supra note 2, at 144. Article 6 discussed scheduled air traffic,
stating simply that there shall be no scheduled international air service without the special permission or other
authorization of the state, and in accordance with the terms of the authorization. Chicago Convention, supra note
13, art. 6. The authorization requirement made article 6 essentially a "charter" for the modem BATA regime
governing scheduled air service. MATrE, supra note 2, at 144. Scheduled air service regulations address routes
and service points, details of designation of air carriers, the capacity which each party's carriers may offer, and
the method of setting rates and fares. Id.
Article 5, which describes the right of nonscheduled flight, was inspired by a relatively liberal spirit and
is the basis for a more liberal regulatory regime for nonscheduled flight. Id. This relatively liberal provision, in
contrast with article 6, has led to the need for BATAs to address other issues in the charter context, including
marketing restrictions, geographical and route restrictions, capacity control, and price control. Id. at 152.
Because of the distinct sources of authority in the Chicago Convention for scheduled and nonscheduled
traffic, BATAs have addressed them with different provisions and limitations, and in some cases even separate
BATAs. Martin Dresner et al., The Canada-U.S. Transport Bilateral: Will It Be Freed?, 56 TRANSP. PRAc. J.
393, 399 (1989). See infra notes 258-69 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of charter air traffic in
the Open Skies accord).
87. The Protocol, supra note 11, art. 2, para. (a).
88. The Agreement, supra note 10, art. 1, para (D).
89. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 2, para (2). This is to be distinguished
from cabotage, where air carriers pick up and drop off domestic passengers, mail, and cargo while remaining
within the territory of the other country.
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and individually granted.90 However, Open Skies continues to bar cabotage9 t by airlines
of one country in the territory of the other.9
B. Capacity
1. Background
Capacity clauses regulate the size and frequency of air carriers operating on designated
routes.9 They are fumdamental parts of most BATAs.94 They are also particularly subject
to criticism leveled at the BATA system as a whole; they allow government officials to
impose constraints on economic aspects of airline operations best left to market forces to
control.95 Consistent with the notion that many matters would be addressed multilaterally
when the Chicago Convention was created, there was no capacity clause provision included
in the Standard Form.
Bermuda I contained no express provision regulating capacity but addressed it in the
Bermuda Capacity Principles,' which gave carriers the freedom to operate at the frequency
they considered justified.9 8 By the 1970s, the liberal capacity arrangements of Bermuda
I led to dissatisfaction in the U.K. as U.S. carrier capacity soared. 9 When the U.S. Civil
Aeronautics Board, fi 1976, made no effort to limit the capacity of U.S. carriers, the refusal
and other U.K grievances led ultimately to U.K renunciation of Bermuda I and the
negotiation of Bermuda 1.°
90. See e.g. Bermuda I, supra note 7, annex II; the Agreement, supra note 10, schedule annex (listing
all permissible routes to be flown by air carriers of both parties, including allowed intermediate and beyond
points).
91. See DIEDEis-VmtscaooR, supra note 23, at 17 (defining cabotage as barring foreign carriers from
operating between any ro points in the territory of a State).
92. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 2, para. (3). See supra notes 76-78
and accompanying text (describing silence regarding cabotage as a source of European criticism of Open Skies).
93. Diamond, supra note 7, at 427.
94. Id. at 428.
95. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 35, at 28 "[G]overmnental regulatory authorities somehow presume to
know more about passenger demand and market development than airline management knows". Id. See
DmnsEY, supra note 7, at 63 (discussing capacity predetermination).
96. Gertler, supra note 18, at 43.
97. Bermuda I, Final Act, §§ 4-6, quoted in Diamond, supra note 7, at 495-96.
98. Id. at 446. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (describing the competitive implications of
the Bermuda Principles).
The Principles included fair and equal opportunity for the carriers of the two nations to operate on any
route; that is, as long as operation did not unduly affect the services of the other Contracting Party's carriers.
Bermuda I, supra note 7, Final Act, sees. 4,5. In setting traffic levels, carriers were directed to refer primarily
to traffic demands. Id. sec. 6. These Principles also applied to traffic destined for and coming from third
countries. Id. However, the Bermuda Principles related primarily to the requirements between the U.S. and the
U.K., and only secondarily to the requirements of fifth freedom Traffic. Dempsey, supra note 29, at 315 n.35.
In short, the Bermuda Principles did not predetermine capacity, but provided, in a broad and vague manner,
liberal and flexible guidelines, subject to ex post facto control. MATrE, supra note 2, at 232.
99. DEMPsEY, supra note 7, at 64. As U.K. carrier shares declined on Bermuda I routes, the U.S. Civil
Aeronautics Board made no effort to limit US capacity. Id. at 27. Thus, in 1976, U.S. airline revenues reached
$512.8 million, while U.K. carrier revenue was only $227.5 million. Id. quoting Mabry, supra, note 27, at 1263-
64.
100. DE PS , supra note 7, at 27.
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Fundamental problems arise as large and small nations attempt to distribute capacity
between their carriers.' As weaker and stronger traffic-generating countries competed
for traffic, the former commonly did so by exchanging Bermuda I-type ex post facto capacity
review with capacity predetermination." 2 Capacity predetermination requires
governments to approve capacity before air service on those routes may begin.0 3
Bermuda II imposed restrictive governmental control of capacity."°4 It restricted
capacity levels and virtually abolished U.S. fifth freedom rights.' Bermuda I addressed
capacity in terms of efficiency and preventing wasted resources, reflecting the presence of
new, low fare airlines in the mature U.S.-U.K. market.0 6 Bermuda 11's approach to
capacity contrasts with that of Bermuda I, which allowed the airlines to choose the capacity
they considered justified."°e Commentators have called the Bermuda Ilsystem one which
stops just short of involving predetermination.!"s
U.S. policy returned to its Chicago Convention negotiating stance following U.S.
aviation deregulation, with abandoned demands for equal operating opportunities for the
carriers of each country and an equivalent exchange of traffic rights, in favor of
procompetitive policies aimed at enhancing consumer benefits.0 9 Pursuant to these
policies, Benelux-type BATAs included free determination by the designated airlines of
capacity and frequency."10 Among those BATAs was the 1978 U.S.-Netherlands
Protocol."'
2. Capacity in Open Skies
Air carriers make the primary capacity allocation decisions under the Open Skies
accord." 2 Open Skies recognizes that several elements defined by the DOT Open Skies
Definition Order already exist in U.S.-Netherlands air traffic."' Both parties must allow
"fair, equal, and nondiscriminatory opportunities" for airlines of the other Contracting Party
to compete with its own carriers." 4 Contracting Parties are forbidden to limit traffic,
101. MATTE, supra note 2 at 145. Nations differ in their attitudes as to the value of commercial rights.
1d. Those who view the traffic they generate as "belonging" to them generally favor predetermining capacity
based on the proportion of traffic which originates in their territory. Id.
102. DEMSEY, supra note 7, at 63. Capacity predetermination comes in two forms: (1) general Bermuda
I-like capacity principles, but subject to prior, rather than ex post facto review; and (2) provisions calling for
reciprocity or equal sharing of capacity. Id.
103. Id. BATAs employing capacity predetermination often require capacity between Contracting Parties
to be distributed on a 50/50, or occasionally 60/40, basis. MATrE, supra note 2, at 146.
104. DEwsEY, supra note 7, at 28. See generally Mabry, supra note 27, at 1273-74 (detailing specific
mechanisms by which Bermuda II restricted capacity between the U.S. and U.K.).
105. DEMPsEY, supra note 7, at 28.
106. MATr, supra note 2, at 243.
107. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
108. MATTE, supra note 2, at 244.
109. DEMPsEY, supra note 7, at 31. See infra notes 126-29 (describing the anticompetitive environment
created by Bermuda lrs emphasis on equal operating opportunities).
110. Id. at 31-33.
111. Id. at 32.
112. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 9.
113. Id. at 1.
114. Id, attachment B, pt. 9, para. (1). See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (discussing how the
Open Skies Contracting Parties define their competitive philosophy in the fair competition and discrimination
provision of the Open Skies accord).
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frequency, regularity of service, or types of aircraft used by designated airlines of the other
Contracting Party on a unilateral basis. 5 This provision, however, seems to leave open
the possibility for both Contracting Parties, acting together, to limit capacity.
The Contracting Parties may not impose a first-refusal requirement,1 6 up-lift
ratio," 7 no-objection fee,"' or any other requirement with respect to capacity, frequency,
or traffic inconsistent with purposes of the Open Skies philosophy.' 19 Finally, neither
Contracting Party can require air carriers to file schedules, charter flight programs, or
operational plans beyond those required for uniform enforcement of regulations.1
20
C. Fair Competition and Discrimination
1. Historical Development
Fair competition and discrimination provisions are designed to combat discriminatory
and anticompetitive conduct.' 2 ' The Standard Form mentioned fair competition and
discrimination only briefly, calling for non-discriminatory application of airport charges and
customs exceptions. 2 2 Fair competition was addressed thoroughly in the Bermuda
Principles portion of Bermuda L 3 In Bermuda I and other BATAs formed before 1977,
fair competition provisions related primarily to capacity provisions.2 4
In contrast to the liberal spirit of Bermuda I, which left most operating decisions to the
air carriers," 5 Bermuda II created a far less competitive environment. 6 The language
of Bermuda Irs fair competition and discrimination provision emphasized safe, adequate,
and efficient international air transport.2 7 Bermuda II addressed fair competition by
calling for a "fair and equal opportunity to compete, instead of operate."' Bermuda II
mandated a maximur two-year period during which carriers of one country may not increase
115. Id, attachment B, pt. 9, para. (2).
116. A first-refusal agreement is a requirement that a national airline be given frst opportunity to have
a particular business, before a foreign carrier may have it. Bogosian, supra, note 45, at 1014 n.24.
117. An up-lift ratio defines the traffic of one airline in terms of the traffic of another. Id. at 1014 n.25.
118. A no objection fee is a fixed fee paid to a national airline before a foreign airline may operate. Id.
at 1014 n.26.
119. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 9, para. (3).
120. Id. at para (4).
121. DEMPSrY, supra, note 7, at 69.
122. Gertler, supra note 18, at 43.
123. MATrE, supra note 2, at 231-232. The Bermuda Principles are widely regarded as among the most
significant aspects of Bermuda L See id. at 231 (describing the Final Act as the most important part because it
contains the Bermuda Principles); DEMPSEY, supra note 7 at 54 (describing Bermuda Principles as the hallmark
of Bermuda 1).
124. DEwsEY, supra note 7, at 71.
125. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
126. See generaly DmcPsEY, supra note 7, at 28 (describing restrictive provisions of Bermuda 11). A
Congressional critic called Bermuda I'the greatest step backward in forty years of attempting to bring market-
oriented competition to international aviation.- Id. at 29, quoting 124 CoNG. RFc. S12264 (daily ed. Aug. 1,
1978)(remarks of Sen. Commerce Committee Chariman Howard Cannon (D-Nev.)).
127. MATrT, supra note 2, at 236.
128. Id. at 238, quoting Bermuda II, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 1.
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their frequency, in order to guarantee to the carrier of the other country an equal opportunity
to compete.
129
While deregulating aviation during the Carter era, Congress legislated for fair
competition, empoweringthe DOT to suspend or cancel a foreign carrier's fares or suspend
its operating permit for anticompetitive practices. 13' The U.S. also adopted the U.S. Model
Agreement to replace the former de facto model, Bermuda L13' The Model Agreement
reflected a negotiating strategy designed to counteract foreign discriminatory practices.132
In BATAs signed after Bermuda II, the U.S. included a new type of provision which
explicitly regulated the activities prone to discriminatory conduct.3 3 Among these post-
Bermuda IIBATAs were numerous Benelux-types BATAs, including the U.S.-Netherlands
Protocol, which explicitly called for an elimination of discriminatory and unfair methods of
competition."M
2. Fair Competition and Discrimination in Open Skies
Open Skies addresses fair competition and discrimination as described in the Open Skies
policy: the Open Skies accord will "permit,... carriers essentially free access to their
respective markets, and.., allow these carriers the greatest flexibility to conduct their
business without undue government intervention, in order to benefit the travelling and the
shipping public." 13 5 Under Open Skies the parties must allow "fair, equal, and
nondiscriminatory opportunit[ies]" for the other party's airlines to compete with domestic
carriers." 6
3. Criticisms of Fair Competition and Discrimination Provisions of Open Skies
Criticisms of the Definition Order, forwarded to the DOT pursuant to DOT Order 92-4-
53, included the fact that Open Skies-type BATAs will not guarantee benefits of equal
129. Bermuda II, supra note 9, art. 11, para. 1. Thus Bermuda II's ironically named fair competition
provisions actually created an anti-competitive environment designed to force an even distribution of capacity
between U.S. and U.K. carriers. See Hill, supra note 27, at 115 (noting U.K. negotiators desire to bring the
balance of earnings to a more favorable position for U.K. carriers); Mabry, supra note 27, at 1279 (noting British
Airways estimate that it will gain approximately 15 million pounds as a result of Bermuda 11).
130. DEMwsEy, supra note 7, at 70.
131. Bogosian, supra note 45, at 1012-13 (describing U.S. efforts to determine the direction of U.S.
international air transport policy following adoption of Bermuda 11). The new liberalized aviation policy was also
reflected in Congress adopting the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No 96-192,
94 Stat. 35, and the U.S. Model Agreement. Id.
132. DEMPsEY, supra note 7, at 71. See generally Bogosian, supra note 45, at 1014 (describing the U.S.
Model Agreement as granting fair and equal opportunity to compete, and stating unfair competition practices
and discriminations should be removed). See infra text accompanying note 160-61 (giving examples of
anticompetitive conduct such as unequal airport and user charges, preferentional customs and immigration
services for the national carrier, ticket taxes only applicable to foreign carriers, restrictions on the carriage of
outgoing mail and cargo by foreign carriers, restrictions upon foreign carrier advertising, national carrier
monopolies in check-in and boarding facilities, ticket stocks, and computer reservation systems).
133. DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 72.
134. Id. at 35.
135. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, at 1.
136. Id at attachment B, pt. 9, para. (1). See supra notes 2 1-24 (describing the liberal interpretation of
Bermuda Is "fair and equal opportunities to operate"). Cf. supra notes 128-29 (describing the restrictive
interpretation of Bermuda I/'s "fair and equal opportunity to compete").
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economic value for U.S. carriers.'37 Open Skies reflects a market-oriented philosophy
designed to minimize governmental interference. 3 As free competition under Bermuda
I eventually allowed U.S. carriers to carry more than fifty percent of transatlantic traffic in
the 1970s, 13 9 Open Skies also creates a system where some carriers may succeed at the
expense of others.
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), for example, objects because it views the Open
Skies policy as giving disproportionate economic benefits to European airlines.14 ALPA
believes the unilateral extension of U.S. benefits violates the policy objectives of developing
"a viable, privately owned United States air transport industry."' 4 ' ALPA directs its
attention specifically to the Netherlands, noting the disparity between the number of
passengers carried by U.S. carriers and by KLM Royal Dutch Airlines.'
42
By contrast, U.S. carriers are ambivalent. According to the DOT, while U.S. carriers
favor a less regulated international aviation environment, they also feel that access to the
U.S. market is worth more to foreign carriers than access to their markets is worth to U.S.
carriers. 43 Thus, U.S. carriers have not expressed unbridled support for the Open Skies
accord.'4 For example, U.S. carriers suggested that the DOT not approve a service
integration between KLM and Northwest Airlines'45 unless the Netherlands obligates itself
to attempt to secure an Open Skies regime between the U.S. and all EEC member
nations.
46
U.S. carriers severely criticized British Airway's proposal to acquire a forty-four percent
stake in USAir for $750 million. 47 U.S. carriers wanted the DOT to link approval of
British Airways' proposal with new access to U.K. airports, thereby balancing British
Airways' access to U.S. markets through USAir. 48 The DOT hinted at linkage between
approval of British Airway's proposal and liberalization of the current U.S.-U.K.
BATA. 49 Eventually, however, the DOT did not take a final position on the proposal,
because British Airvays withdrew its proposal in the face of criticism."'
137. Definition Order, supra note 1, at 2.
138. Memorandum of Consoltations, supra note 3, at 1.
139. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
140. Comments of Air Line Pilots Association, June 4, 1992, at 1 (issued in response to Department of
Transportation Order No. 92-4-53 (May 5, 1992)) (on file at The Transnational Lanyer).
141. Id. at 2, quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1502(b)(1).
142. IL at 3. U.S. citizens made up 51.5% of the U.S.-Netherlands passengers in 1990, yet U.S flag
carriers only carried 19.3 % of the total passengers. Id. Extending additional benefits to the Netherlands, by way
of additional intermediate and beyond rights, would also increase the disparity, in all likelihood at the expense
of U.S. carriers. Id.
143. Transportation Department Grants Final Approval to KLM/Northwest Link, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily
(BNA) (Jan. 13, 1993) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt File.
144. See James Ott, More Skies to Open as U.S. Signs Pacts, AVIAT7ON WK. & SP. TECH., September 14,
1992, at 32 (describing U.S. reaction as reserved).
145. See infra note 200 (describing the integration of services between KLM Royal Dutch Airlines and
Northwest Airlines).
146. In the matter of the Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holdings, Inc., Order 89-9-51, No.
46371, 1989 DOT Av. LEXIS 643 (Sept. 29, 1989) (consent order), at LEXIS *16.
147. James Ott, Current Bilateral Issues Buffet British Airways-USAir Decision, AVIAnON WK. & SP.
TECH., December 14-21, 1992, at 35.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. British Airways, Facing Likely Disapprova Drops Proposed USAir Pact, AIRPORTS, Jan. 5, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Tran Library, Airpts File.
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Criticism arose the last time the U.S. abandoned demands for equal exchanges of
economic benefits in BATA negotiation.' Criticism came from industry executives and
Congress when the Carter administration began its policy of trading hard rights for soft
rights.152 The subsequent Reagan administration, however, heard and responded to the
criticism.' Negotiators began pushing for BATA partners to live up to their promises of
antidiscriminatory practices and demanding more quid pro quo in BATA negotiations."'
DOT officials explained the tougher stance by stressing the reality that many foreign trading
partners were unwilling to lower constraints to competition, although at least one official
noted that there simply were no more routes to the U.S. available to trade for soft rights. 5 '
Of course, other factors also led to a decline of U.S. willingness to forego quid pro quo
bilateral bargaining. Those factors included a continuing trend in the' "decline of the U.S.
passenger share in international markets, sharply increased fuel prices, and the recession of
the late 1970s." 56
D. Commercial Operations
1. Historical Development
Foreign countries who are dissatisfied with the liberal Benelux-type BATAs upon which
the U.S. has insisted may respond with restrictive and anticompetitive conduct to favor local-
flag carriers at the expense of foreign carriers.'s7 To combat these practices, U.S. BATAs
signed since 1978 have replaced general statements extolling fair and free opportunities to
compete with commercial operations provisions regulating specific trade practices.1
58
Generally, anticompetitive conduct means foreign carriers are treated less favorably than
local-flag carriers, and therefore have a more difficult time competing for passengers and
freight. 59 Examples of discriminatory and anticompetitive conduct include: unequal
151. See DEMPsa/, supra note 7, at 231-34 (describing criticism of the Carter administration "open skies"
policy). To implement the Carter administration objectives, a strategy aimed at enhancing consumer benefits
replaced the previous goal of exchanging equivalent economic benefits. Id. at 31.
152. See supra text accompanying note 31 (defining 'hard rights" as access to interior U.S. points, and
"soft rights" as vague promises of pricing flexibility and prohibitions against anticompetitive behavior). A typical
industry complaint came from C.E. Meyer, Jr., President of TWA, during Senate hearing on the International
Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979: "Foreign governments often negotiate with the primary goal of
providing economic advantages for their flag-carriers, while the United States frequently concentrates exclusively
on obtaining liberal agreements." DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 232. Congress criticized the pursuit of agreements
without regard to their economic effects on U.S.-flag carriers. Id. Congressional criticism was directed
specifically at the U.S. policy of trading hard rights for soft rights. Id. at 233.
153. Dmpnsm,, supra note 7 at 234-35 (describing the firmer BATA negotiating stance taken by the
Reagan administration).
154. Id. at 235.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 87.
157. Id at 11. Smaller countries with whom the U.S. signed liberal, market oriented BATAs felt that such
agreements were thrust upon them, and their dissatisfaction was often manifested in anticompetitive behavior.
Id. at 112.
158. Id. at 71-72.
159. Id. at 111.
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airport and user charges;' 6° preferential customs and immigration services for the national
carrier; special tickets available only on the national carrier to the detriment of foieign
carriers; ticket taxes applied only to foreign carriers; and various national carrier
monopolies.
161
2. Commercial Operations Provisions in Open Skies
Open Skies discusses commercial operation in more detail than the Benelux-type
BATAs. Article 10 of the Protocol set user charges at reasonable, non-discriminatory
levels. 62 Open Skies replaces article 10, which allowed airlines to perform their own
ground handling in the territory of the other, with a provision detailing more commercial
operations.' 63 Open Skies allows airlines of one Contracting Party to establish offices in
the territory of the other to promote and sell air transportation.'" Airlines may also bring
their own staffs into the territory of the other Contracting Party, subject only to laws and
regulations relating to entry, residence, and employment. 65
The Protocol provision allowing each airline to perform its own ground-handling
operations ("self-handling") remains in the Open Skies accord.'66 While the Protocol
limited self-handling as subject to the availability of airport facilities, Open Skies narrows
self-handling limitations to requirements of airport safety.167 Open Skies also requires that
if self-handling is not authorized, services will be provided equally to all airlines, and service
charges and quality must compare with what self-handling would provide.'
61
Now that airlines will be free to sell air transportation in the territory of the other
directly, or through agents,169 Open Skies appears to free the way for airlines to sell tickets
in the territory of the other Contracting Party for flights not involving the territory of that
Contracting Party. Airlines may sell transportation in the currency of that territory or any
other freely convertible currency. 17  Other currency regulations allow for airlines to pay
for local expenses, including fuel, in local currency or in other freely convertible currency,
subject only to local currency regulations.'7 ' Carriers will be able to convert and remit to
their country local revenues in excess of sums locally disbursed. 172 Conversion and
160. User charges are defined in the Open Skies accord as aircraft, i.e. landing, charges, and charges for
navigation, environmental, and security facilities and services. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3,
attachment B, pt. 8, para. (2).
161. DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 111.
162. The Protocol, supra note 11, art. 10.
163. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 6. However, the Netherlands would
not agree to a U.S. proposal that U.S. carriers be allowed to supply ground handling services for other
international airlines in the Netherlands. Id. at 2.
164. Id., attachment B, pt. 6, para. (1).
165. Id. at pt. 6, para. (2).
166. Id. at pt. 6, para. (3).
167. Id.
168. Id. See Definition Order, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that the ability to self-handle guards against
monopolistic and discriminatory practices at airports). Guarding against discriminatory practices will facilitate
airlines in exercising the liberal fifth freedom rights granted under the Open Skies accord. lal
169. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 6, para. (4). As a rule, BATAs do
not include these provisions, leaving each airline free to sell what it likes. Wassenbergh, supra note 44, at 29.
170. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 6, para. (4).
171. Id. at pt. 6, para. (5).
172. Id. at pt. 6, para. (6).
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remittance shall be prompt, shall not be restricted or taxed, and shall be exchanged at rates
applicable at the time such revenues are presented for conversion and remittance.'03
Airlines are also able to employ surface transportation of cargo to or from points in third
countries, including to airports and airlines may offer combinations of air and surface
transport (intermodal rights) at one price. 74
Reciprocity agreements from the Agreement remain in Open Skies, exempting
equipment, fuel, supplies, spare parts, and aircraft stores175 from taxes, levies, duties, fees,
and charges, except for charges based on costs of services provided. 76 User charges177
imposed by one Contracting Party must be "just, reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and
equitably apportioned among categories of users."' They may not be less favorable than
the most favorable terms available to any other airline. 79 Lastly, user charges are to be
set at a level no greater than an equitable portion of the full cost to the charging
authorities.' A new provision in Open Skies encourages consultations between charging
authorities and the airlines to assure reasonable user charges.' Thus, in its demand for
nondiscriminatory commercial operations, Open Skies demands fair treatment in areas such
as air transport sales, ground handling, currency conversion and remittance, user charges,
and fee exemptions, where anticompetitive behavior might hinder U.S.-flag carrier operation
in the Netherlands.
1 2
E. Multiple Designation
1. Historical Develoment of Designation Provisions
Bermuda Iallowed the designation of multiple carriers (multiple designation) to serve
its specified routes.'83 It called for "carrier or carriers," that is, the possibility of more than
one carrier operating on a designated route.'8 4 For many years, though, the Civil
Aeronautics Board policy was to designate only enough carriers to maintain a "rough parity"
173. Id.
174. Id. at pt. 6, para. (7).
175. Stores are specified in Open Skies to include food, beverages, liquor, and tobacco. Memorandum of
Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 7, para. (1).
176. Id. at pt. 7., para. (1),(2).
177. See infra note 160 (defining user charges as charges made to airlines for the provision of airport, air
navigation, or aviation security property or facilities).
178. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachement B, pt. 7, para. (1).
179. Id.
180. Id. at pt. 7, para. (2).
181. Id. at pt. 7, para. (3).
182. Much anticompetitive behavior as described above is prohibited in the U.S. by antitrust laws.
DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 112. One commentator notes that foreign countries complain about U.S. practices
barring cabotage, U.S. governmental refusal to pay for flights of citizens abroad except aboard U.S.-flag carriers,
and U.S. Postal Service policy of tendering mail to U.S.-flag carriers exclusively. Id. at 112, n.4.
183. lia at 65. Contracting Parties were free to designate an air carrier or carriers, as long as they fulfill
the conditions imposed by each nation's aeronautical authorities. Bermuda I, supra note 7, art. 2, para. (2). In
contrast, single designation allows each Contracting Party to designate only one carrier for each route. MAITE,
supra note 2, at 233 n.20.
Single designation serves the needs of countries with one national air carrier, whereas the U.S., with
numerous international air carriers has traditionally insisted on multiple designation. DEmPsEY, supra note 7,
at 66.
184. Bermuda I, supra note 7, art. 2.
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with foreign air carriers operating in the market.'85 Then in the late 1970s, the Civil
Aeronautics Board began designating large numbers of new U.S. carriers to service routes
between interior U.S. points and London, routes which had previously been dormant. 8 6
The U.S. share of the the U.S.-U.K. transatlantic market soon exceeded the U.K. share. 87
As a result, Bermuda Ilstrictly qualified the "carrier or carriers" language of Bermuda Lt88
2. Multiple Designation in the U.S.-Netherlands Market
Benelux-type BATAs granted unlimited designation of carriers, which was considered
one of their main characteristics."3 9 Foreign countries who agreed to grant U.S. carriers
unlimited designation often received route authority to serve additional U.S. interior points
in return."9°
Open Skies allows multiple designation of carriers providing scheduled or nonscheduled
air services, subject only to notification of the other country. 91 In Open Skies, the
Contracting Parties must grant appropriate authorization to designated airlines of the other
country with "minimal procedural delay." 19 In this regard, Open Skies is substantially
similar to the Protocol, which granted authority without undue delay. 93
F. Substantial National Ownership and Control in Open Skies
The Chicago Convention considered national ownership and control provisions in
articles 17 through 21.194 Bermuda I required that "substantial ownership and effective
control of... carrier[s] [be] vested in nationals of either Contracting Party."'195 For fifty
years, U.S. aviation authorities have required "actual control" and seventy-five percent of
the voting shares of U.S. airlines to be in American hands. 96
185. DEarsPEY, supra note 7, at 66. For 30 years, the literal language of Bermuda I, which allowed
multiple designation, was limited to a "general quid pro quo balance" of national carriers on international routes.
Id. at 26.
186. Id. at 27.
187. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
188. Bermuda II, supra note 9, art. 3 para. (2). Multiple designation was only included in Bermuda I1 on
high density routes; low density North Atlantic routes called for single designation until a predetermined demand
level was reached, at which time there would become multiple designation on those routes. MATrE, supra note
2, at 242-243.
189. DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 68.
190. Id. For example, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines received authorization to serve Miami, Boston, Houston,
Atlanta and Los Angeles. Id.
191. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 3, para. (1). See infra notes 255-57
and accompanying text (describing previous differences in treatment of scheduled and nonscheduled traffic under
the Agreement and the Protocol).
192. Memorandum of Consultations, supra. pt. 3, para. (2).
193. The Protocol, aupra note 11, art. 2, para (d).
194. Chicago Convention, supra note 13, art. 17 ("Aircraft have the nationality of the State in which they
are registered"). But see Wassenbergh, supra note 44, at 22-23 (listing twelve permutations of airplane, crew,
charter and lessor and lessee, which cross national boundaries and blur distinctions between aircraft nationality).
195. Bermuda I, supra note 7, art. 6.
196. Card, supra note 28, at 4. See also 49 U.S.C. § 1301(16) (1993) (defining an airline corporation as
a citizen only ifits president and at least two-thirds of its Board of Directors are U.S. citizens and if at least 75%
of the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons who are citizens of the U.S.).
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A provision requiring substantial national ownership and control, originally in article
4 of the Agreement, remains in the Open Skies accord. 197 It supplements each Contracting
Party's right to withhold or revoke privileges, with the additional authority to suspend, limit,
or impose conditions on rights under the accord, if it is not satisfied that substantial
ownership and effective control of each airline is vested in nationals of the Contracting
Party.198 The additional remedies of suspending, limiting, or conditioning traffic rights
leaves open the possibility that a Contracting Party may choose to grant rights under Open
Skies even where there is not substantial national ownership and effective control.
The Open Skies policy recognizes a trend noted by commentators: criteria involving
national ownership of air carriers are no longer strictly enforced or adhered to in
practice.199 In Open Skies the parties specifically agree to give sympathetic consideration
to the concept of commercial cooperation and integration of commercial operations between
each country's airlines, within the parameters of their antitrust and competition laws, and "to
provide fair and expeditious consideration to any... arrangements filed for approval and
antitrust immunity."2"
This liberal substantial ownership and control requirement has come under attack. In
its comments specifically addressed to the Definition Order, ALPA urged that Open Skies
benefits be extended only to foreign carriers whose ownership is strictly private, as opposed
197. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 4.
198. Id.
199. See Wassenbergh, supra note 40, at 68. Within the EEC, article 7 of the Treaty of Rome bans
.nationality" as a criterion for licensing companies in the EEC countries. Id.
200. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, at 1. The Open Skies accord thus lessens barriers to
Dutch carriers establishing establish ownership positions in U.S. carriers, and vice versa.
In 1989, the DOT approved a KLM ownership position in Northwest Airlines. Acquisition of Northwest
Airlines by Wings Holdings, Inc., supra note 146. On November 16, 1992, the DOT granted preliminary
approval and antitrust immunity to a service integration between Northwest Airlines and KLM. Joint Application
of Northwest Airlines, Inc. and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines for Approval and Antitrust Immunity, Order 92-11-
27, No. 48342, 1992 DOT Av. LEXIS 827 (Nov. 16, 1992) (order to show cause). The integration includes a
joint marketing operation, coordinated schedules and pricing, a unified travel agency commision program, pooled
revenues from joint services, and creation of a joint identity by operating under the same trademarks and
branding. Id. at *7. The DOT also noted the approval was consistent with the Open Skies accord and may
encourage other countries to enter liberal aviation arrangements with the U.S. Id. at *26. The DOT concluded
that the service integration will not change the ownership structure of Northwest and that Northwest will remain
under control of U.S. citizens. Id. at *48. The Definition Order notes that some proposals regarding limiting
national ownership and control relate to matters governed by statute and are thus beyond DOT control.
Definition Order, supra note 1, at 6. Policy decisions within DOT control are considered best dealt with on a
case by case basis. Id. The DOT granted final approval on January 11, 1993. Transportation Department Grants
Final Approval to KLM/Northwest Link, supra note 143.
Other transborder carrier mergers have been proposed outside the context of an Open Skies-type
relationship. On January 7, 1993, the DOT approved a $450 million stake in U.S. Continental Airlines by Air
Canada whereby Air Canada acquired 27.5% total equity and 24% voting stock. Foreign Investment, Super
Majority Issues Seen Crucial in DOT Approval of Air Canada/Continental Deal, Daily Rep. For Executives
(BNA) No. 6, at d23 (Jan. 11, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Drexec File. Continental dropped
several supermajority voting plans as possibly involving control by Air Canada. Id.
Accepted definitions of U.S. control were brought into question by a British Airways proposal to invest
$750 million in USAir in exchange for a 44% stake. See Carole A. Shifrin, British Airways, USAair Escalate
Offensive Against Dissenters, AvIATIoN WK. & SP. TECH., Dec. 14-21 1992, at 30 (discussing British Airways
proposal to purchase a stake in USAir). The proposal would give British Airways rights to elect 25% of USAir's
directors, and thus a veto power on USAir's 80% supermajority requirement for some important issues. James
Ott, Current Bilateral Issues Buffet British Airways-USAir Decision, AVIATION WK & Sp. TECH., Dec. 14-21,
1992, at 35.
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to governmentally owned or subsidized foreign carriers. °1 ALPA urges that benefits
should only be extended to carriers who are exclusively under the actual control of citizens
of the party to the Open Skies agreement." 2
G. Tariff Clauses
1. Historical Development of Tariff Clauses
The Chicago Convention did not regulate rates or tariffs charged by air carriers in
BATAs,20 3 nor did the Standard Form include a specific tariff provision.2°4 Instead, the
International Air Transport Association (LATA), consisting of airline companies that carry
international traffic, was created primarily to set tariffs for international routes. °5
Bermuda Iallocated tariff-making authority to the carriers, subject to approval of both
governments, using the IATA tariff-making machinery whenever possible. 2 6 Tariffs
charged by air carriers were subject to "the approval of both Contracting Parties."20 7 Tariff
agreements which originated with the IATA were subject to approval of the U.S. Civil
Aeronautics Board. 20 8 Bermuda I also provided for procedures in case of
disagreement. 2 9
The stable IATA machinery was attacked on two fronts in the 1960s: the U.S. began
refusing explicitly to endorse IATA tariffs, and non-IATA charters began providing more
low-price competition. 210 In the 1970s, increases in the price of aviation fuel and
overcapacity through the introduction of wide-body aircraft, decreased the ability of IATA
to set tariffs and of governments to agree to them.211 In the face of these factors, Bermuda
201. Comments of Air Line Pilots Association, supra note 140, at 4.
202. Id. For example, without this provision, France, who shares a restrictive BATA with the U.S., could
take advantage of a liberal U.S.-Belgium agreement by Air France purchasing effective control of Belgian
Sabena Airlines. id. at 5.
203. DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 52. The term "tariff" is used broadly to include the prices paid for the air
transportation of passengers, baggage and cargo, and the terms under which those prices will apply. Id. at 50
n.20. However, the terms "tariff;- "fare,- and "rate" are often used interchangeably, as they are in this Comment.
204. Gertler, supra note 18, at 51.
205. The IATA was formed in 1945. It was primarily created to set international rates; its membership
consists of international air carriers. DEmPSEY, supra note 7, at 13.
The IATA was one of two multinational bodies were created soon after the end of World War II to help
develop international aviation. Id. The other body is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which
was described in articles 7 through 66 of the Chicago Convention and established in 1947. Its primary focus is
on matters of aviation safety and navigation. Id. at 12-13.
206. Id. at 58-59.
207. Bermuda I, supra note 7, annex II, para. (a). This type of approval mechanism is alternately called
"double approval- or 'single disapproval.-
208. Id. annex II, para. (1). The CAB agreed that IATA rate-making machinery would be exempt from
US antitrust laws. DEMPSIY, supra note 7, at 53.
209. Both nations lad 30 days to approve submitted tariffs. Bermuda I, supra note 7, annex II, para. (c).
Tariffs on which there was not agreement would either be provisionally effective or suspended pending
resolution of the dispute. :DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 53. Finally, any tariffs charged by either party had to be
"fixed at reasonable levelD due regard being paid to all relevant factors, such as cost of operation, reasonable
profit and the rates charged by any other air carriers.- Bermuda I, supra, note 7, annex II, pass. (h).
210. DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 59.
211. Id. at 59-60.
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II contained more restrictive pricing provisions. 212 However, Carter administration
pressure to liberalize international aviation resulted in the restrictive Bermuda II pricing
provisions not being widely reproduced in other U.S. BATAs.
213
Tariff clauses were liberalized in the 1970s as part of U.S. aviation deregulation.
214
The Benelux-type agreements encouraged low tariffs, set by individual airlines on the basis
of market "without reference to the ratemaking machinery of the IATA." 2 5 The U.S.-
Netherlands Protocol incorporated U.S. policy of mostly unrestricted rates . 6
2. Tariffs in Open Skies
Open Skies does not amend the tariff provisions of the Protocol. Under article 6 of the
Protocol, the Contracting Parties are to facilitate the expansion of international air
transportation by setting the lowest fares that are not predatory, discriminatory, or tending
to create a monopoly.2 7 Government interference is limited to preventing predatory or
discriminatory pricing.218 In contrast to Bermuda I, IATA rate making is ignored, and
individual airlines set tariffs, aiming for the lowest fares.219 Open Skies also retains fare
disapproval mechanisms from the Protocol
22 °
H. Dispute Resolution Before and After Open Skies
BATA models usually include dispute resolution procedures.221 The Standard Form
provided an arbitration option in case of dispute. 2' Later, the multinational International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) became a common forum for dispute resolution.223
212. Id. at 60. Bermuda HIcalled for approval 105 days in advance. Bermuda II, supra note 9, art. 12, para.
(4). Basing tariffs on the cost of providing service, instead of on all relevant factors as in Bermuda 1, encouraged
the development of low-fare scheduled services like Laker Airways. MATrE, supra note 2, at 245 n.77. Tariffs
were to be at the lowest level consistent with a high standard of safety and adequate return to the airlines and
to the extent possible, based on the costs of providing such services, assuming reasonable load factors. Id. at
245, quoting Bermuda II, supra, art. 12, para. (2).
213. DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 60.
214. For an excellent description of the effect on air carrier rates due to U.S. aviation deregulation, pricing
competition and loss of IATA antitrust immunity in the U.S., see generally DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 38-45.
215. Id. at 33-34.
216. See generally H. A. Wassenbergh, Innovation in International Air Transportation Regulation (The
U.S.-Netherlands Agreement of10 March 1978), 3 AIR L. 138, 147-151 (1978) (thoroughly analyzing Protocol
tariff provisions).
217. Id. at 148.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. The Protocol allows, but does not demand, one Contracting Party to require air carriers of the other
to file fares with its aviation authorities. Protocol, supra note 11, art. 6, para. (b). Objection to such fares must
be made within 30 days, and either party may request consultations, which must be held within 30 days of
receiving the objection. Id. Both Contracting Parties are required to use best efforts to put into effect any new
tariffs agreed during the consultations. Id.
Dutch negotiators during the drafting of the Protocol wished to maintain sole control over tariffs in the
Netherlands for air traffic which originated in the Netherlands. Thus, the Protocol leaves aviation authorities the
ability to prevent institution of fares only where the flight originates in its territory. Id. art. 6, para. (c). See also
Wassenbergh, supra note 216, at 148 (discussing and criticizing art. 6, para. (c)).
221. DEMPsEY, supra note 7, at 72-75.
222. Gertler, supra note 18, at, 43.
223. DEMPsEY, supra note 7, at 74. See id. at 205 (describing the creation and purpose of the ICAO).
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Among the provisions in Bermuda I was a system of settling disputes concerning
interpretation or application in a non-binding advisory report through the Preliminary
ICAO,224 which became the ICAO."s
However, since Bermuda I, BATAs were more likely to specify an ad hoc arbitration
tribunal instead of relying on ICAO dispute resolution.226 Later agreements have also
recognized the need for dispute prevention, including regular consultation between parties
to identify potential difficulties.27 Bermuda II contained detailed dispute settlement
procedures.22 Article 16 called for the Contracting Parties to "consult" the other regarding
interpretation or application of the agreement, but it stopped short of determining airline
schedules." 9 Article 17 provided for referral to "some person or body" for decision, then
to binding arbitration.
2 0
Dispute resolution provisions of Open Skies, besides those relating to price,23 first
call for formal consultations between the Contracting Parties, then referral to some person
or body agreed to by both Contracting Parties; if the Parties cannot reach an agreement, there
are specific procedures for arbitration.232 These procedures call for quick and binding233
arbitration as the sole method of dispute resolution."4 Open Skies extends the period of
time in which the accord shall remain effective in case of dispute between the Contracting
Parties from one yea.r to two years.235
L Route Restrictions
1. Historical Background and Expansion Under Open Skies
Route restrictions were among the fundamental BATA provisions in the Standard
Form.236 Bermuda I specifically designated routes in an elaborate route annex which
specified international routes and airports. 7 The U.S. also received very liberal, that is,
beyond fifth freedom, rights for carriers traveling beyond London into Europe.
238
224. Bermuda I, supra note 7, art. 9.
225. DmPsEY, supra note 7, at 72.
226. Id. at 74.
227. Id. at 73.
228. MATF, supra note 2, at 248 n.91.
229. Hill, supra note 27, at 119-20.
230. Id. at 120
231. See supra note 220 (describing procedures in case of tariff disagreement under Open Skies).
232. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 10, para. (1).
233. Full effect shall be given by each Contracting Party, consistent with its national law, to any decision
or award of the arbitral tribunal. Id. para. (7).
234. Id. pt. 10.
235. Id. pt. 11. Allc.wing more time for Contracting Party consultations will likely prevent a repeat of the
situation where the U.K. forced negotiations of Bermuda 11 by unilaterally abrogating Bermuda L See supra
notes 26-28 and accompanying text (describing the Bermuda II negotiation process).
236. Gertler, supra note 18, at 43.
237. Diamond, supra note 7, at 454.
238. The term "fifth freedom" means the right to take on passengers, mail, or cargo in the territory of the
other Contracting Party and carry it further to third countries. MATrE, supra note 2, at 143.
In addition to the Chicago Convention, two multinational agreements were signed at the Chicago
Conference. These two agreements describe what is known as the "five freedoms" of international civil aviaton.
Id. The fust was the International Air Services Transit Agreement, December 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 487, 84
U.N.T.S. 389, which provided for the first two, "technical," freedoms for scheduled air service. The two
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Bermuda II contained far more restrictive route provisions.239 While retaining liberal fifth
freedom rights in principle, Bermuda Ilconsiderably restricted U.S. carrier freedom to enjoy
fifth freedom rights to beyond points in Europe. 40
Route restrictions for Dutch airlines are removed from the Agreement and Protocol.241
Since the 1957Agreement, the U.S. has had the right to fly to Amsterdam from any point in
the U.S. via intermediate points and beyond.242 Airlines are allowed to operate without any
restriction on changing the number or type24 3 of aircraft.2? " Combined service flights are
subject only to the condition that they continue transportation onward to or from a point in
the territory of a Contracting Party.24 s Contracting Parties are allowed to enter into
cooperative arrangements such as blocked-space,24 6 code-sharing,2 47 or leasing
arrangements on a reciprocal basis.2 48 Arrangements that include revenue pooling 9 are
prohibited unless both Contracting Parties agree, and arrangements which include cabotage
are absolutely prohibited.s °
freedoms are (1) the privilege to fly across territory without landing and (2) the privilege to land for non-traffic
purposes. Id. The second multinational agreement was the International Air Transport Agreement, December 7,
1944, T.I.A.S. No. 488, 84 U.N.T.S. 387, which described five freedoms of scheduled air service. In addition
to the two freedoms were (3) the privilege to put down passengers, mail, and cargo taken on in the territory of
the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses; (4) the privilege to take on passengers, mail, and cargo
destined for the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses; and (5) the privilege to take on
passengers, mail, and cargo destined for the territory of any other Contracting State and the privilege to put
down passengers, mail, and cargo coming from any such territory. Id. While the former agreement enjoys wide
acceptance, relatively few nations have signed the latter agreement. Id. at 229.
239. Id. at 242. U.K. carriers received more routes to more U.S. gateway cities than under the Bermuda
I route schedule; U.S. carriers received a more limited increase in access to U.K. gateways. Id. at 240. Bermuda
II also introduced special routes exclusively for cargo services. Id. at 241.
240. Id.
241. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 13. Rights granted the Netherlands
are via intermediate points in the U.S. and beyond. Id. at pt. 12, para. (2A).
242. The Agreement, supra note 10, Schedule, art. 1, para. (a).
243. See supra note 44 (defiming change of gauge as using another, usually smaller, aircraft for onward
transportation).
244. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 12, para (4). Compare this unrestricted
language with typical change of gauge limitations in more restrictive BATAs. For example, in Bermuda II,
change of gauge was limited to aircraft having less capacity after the change of aircraft on outbound flights and
more capacity on inbound flights, and which connected within three hours. Wassenbergh, supra note 216, at 143.
245. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, pt. 12, para. (4).
246. Blocked space arrangements allow a charter tour operator to book blocks of seats on scheduled
flights, thereby combining elements of scheduled and charter air service. See infra notes 251-62 and
accompanying text (describing Open Skies treatment of scheduled and nonscheduled air service).
247. Code sharing is defined as publishing the schedules of connecting flights between two airlines under
the code of one airline. Wassenbergh, supra note 44, at 24 n.8.
248. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 12, para. (5).
249. Revenue pooling is defined as a cooperative agreement between carriers who combine revenues from
a shared route, which they then distribute between themselves. DEMPSEY, supra note 7, at 80 n.l 1. See supra
text accompanying note 200 (noting that revenue pooling arrangements are included in the KLM/Northwest
Airlines service integration).
250. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, art. 12, para. (5).
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2. Scheduled and Charter Air Service
In Open Skies, Contracting Parties are allowed to designate charter carriers for
passengers, cargo, or both."1 Open Skies rejects previous distinctions between treatment
of charter and scheduled air service. 2 Charter aircraft may freely operate third and fourth
freedom traffic between the Contracting Parties via intermediate points. 3 They may also
operate freely in the fifth freedom, provided only that at some point in the journey the
territory of the designating country is served. 4
The Protocol nearly eliminated the distinction between charter and scheduled
service." However, the Protocol called for separate designation of charter airlines.
25 6
Under the Protocol, Contracting Parties determined rules for charter air traffic traveling from
their territory, in other words, "country of origin" charter rules. 7
Open Skies removes the few remaining limitations which the Protocolplaced on Dutch
charter operators. 8 As in the Protocol, any excluded charter and cargo traffic is to be
extended favorable consideration based on comity and reciprocity. 9 Open Skies replaces
country of origin rules for charter aviation with a provision allowing airlines operating
charter air transportation to choose between complying with laws, regulations, and rules of
either its home country or the other Contracting Party.26 ° If a Contracting Party applies
different rules to its different airlines or distinguishes between its own airlines and those of
other countries, Open Skies calls for the least restrictive rule to be applied to charter traffic
covered by Open Skies.261 There is an explicit exception made for Contracting Parties to
enforce their laws regarding protection of passenger funds, passenger cancellation, and
refund rights against airlines of the other Contracting Party.26 2
IV. DIscusSION
The Open Skies accord is a radical new form of BATA. By its terms, it calls for free
access to aviation markets, minimal governmental regulation, and great carrier flexibility,
251' Id., pt. 13.
252. See e.g. the Agreement, supra note 10, art. 1, para. (D) (describing only scheduled air service in its
definition of "air services"); the Protocol, supra note 11, art. 4 (granting separate rights to charter air traffic).
See also Wassenbergh, supra note 216, at 143-144 (describing the blurring of distinctions between scheduled
and charter air service in the Protocol).
253. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 13. See supra note 238 (defining third
freedom traffic as the right of an airline to carry traffic from its own territory to another country, and fourth
freedom traffic as the right of an airline to carry traffic from other countries to its own territory).
254. Id.
255. Wassenbergh, supra note 216, at 143. During Protocol negotiations, the Netherlands suggested that
any distinctions be maintained only for purposes of regulating responsibility and financial risk of carriers, tour
operators or freight forwarders. Id. U.S. negotiators desired the distinction between scheduled and charter carriers
partly to restrict charter carriage to third and fourth freedom traffic. Id. at 144.
256. The Protocol, supra note 11, art. 2, para. (c).
257. Id.
258. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, pt. 13. The Protocol limited Dutch
charters to third and fourth freedom traffic only. Wassenbergh, supra note 216, at 143. Country of origin rules
applied to the excluded charter traffic, based on comity and reciprocity between the countries. Id. at 144.
259. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, attachment B, art. 13, para. (a).
260. Id. attachement B, art. 13, para. (b).
261. Id.
262. Id.
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all aimed at facilitating the unrestricted flow of passengers and goods.263 For the most
part, the Open Skies accord creates a free aviation environment. It creates a competitive
environment through its capacity,"' fair competition,2 65 designation of carriers... and
routes,26' and tariff provisions.268 Airlines are now free to sell air service in the territory
of the other country and to supply their own ground services.269 Open Skies removes many
of the commercial operations barriers which previously hampered competition in
international aviation.
The environment created by Open Skies is not totally unregulated. While purporting to
create a free aviation environment, the language of Open Skies' fair competition and
discrimination provision retains some qualifying language. The accord mentions "essentially
free access," and opportunities which are nondiscriminatory, yet "fair [and] equal."270 In
particular, the "fair [and] equal" language echoes the language of Bermuda If's restrictive
fair competition provision.2 7' Open Skies also leaves open the possibility that the
Contracting Parties may act in concert to limit capacity.272
The most significant restriction left in Open Skies is a restriction on cabotageY1
3
Cabotage is forbidden by article 7 of the Chicago Convention and also by U.S.
legislation.274 Thus, the U.S. has legitimate and convenient reasons for keeping cabotage
out of an Open Skies regime. At the same time, while the U.S. claims to be dropping
demands for quid pro quo BATA negotiation, cabotage would be an incredibly valuable right
to grant to foreign carriers. It is also certain that U.S. carriers and employee organizations,
such as the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), would object strongly.275
The Open Skies accord affects international civil aviation in two contexts: the U.S.-
Netherlands aviation relationship and the U.S. relationship with the EEC as a whole. The
Netherlands will be the primary immediate beneficiary of the Open Skies accord. Its
national airline, KIM Royal Dutch Airlines, is now able to fly to any poini in the U.S. from
the Netherlands or intermediary points. 276 KLM will be able to decide, free from
governmental interference, whether or not to provide service to a new U.S. destination.
Conversely, other U.S. carriers will not be able to gain much in the tiny Dutch market.
This is particularly so because U.S. carriers have had access to Amsterdam from any point
in the U.S. since 1957.Y Thus, critics who say that the U.S. will not achieve a quid pro
quo exchange of benefits with the Netherlands are absolutely correct. The Open Skies policy
explicitly dissavows bargaining for benefits of equal economic value.
2 7
263. Id at 1.
264. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 241-50 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 162-82 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
272. See text accompanying note 115.
273. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 41.
275. See Platt, supra note 64, at 188 n. 53 (quoting ALPA president Capt. Randy Babbit, "[l]f you 'are
talking about open-skies cabotage, then I would not have trouble gathering support for a strike.')
276. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, art. 12, para. (2A).
277. See supra text accompanying note 248.
278. Memorandum of Consultations, supra note 3, at 2.
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The Open Skies policy will benefit the U.S. in the European aviation market. Today the
U.S. is facing a potentially powerful BATA negotiating partner in a united EEC.279 A
united EEC aviation market leads to the possibility of intra-EEC cabotage, where air carriers
from beyond the EEC are forbidden from operating between EEC member nations.28
While EEC authorities attempt to forge a united front in BATA negotiation with the U.S.,
Open Skies-type BATAs offer individual European nations the maximum possible access
to the U.S. market. The U.S. Open Skies policy essentially offers European nations a choice:
sign an Open Skies-type BATA with the U.S. now'and receive instant access to the whole
U.S. market, or await united EEC BATA negotiations which have the potential to open the
U.S. cabotage market to EEC carriers. Open Skies appears to be a U.S. attempt to exploit
the conflict between the interests of individual European nations and the interests of the EEC
as a unified aviation entity.
U.S. carriers stand to receive benefits of less economic value than each BATA partner,
because Open Skies opens the vast U.S. market to European signers of Open Skies-type
BATAs. Yet, the U.S. benefits by expanding the network of countries offering unlimited and
intermediate rights in Europe. These rights are probably greater than the U.S. could demand
negotiating with the united EEC, and the U.S. is in no danger of facing demands for cabotage
access to the U.S. market.
The Open Skies accord leaves open the possibility that aviation authorities may grant
rights to an airline not controlled by nationals of a Contracting Party.281 This raises several
issues. For one, national identity of air carriers under the Chicago Convention and almost
all BATAs seem to forbid transborder conglomerations. Secondly, such conglomerated
airlines will be able to operate hub and spoke operations on both continents. A hypothetical
integrated airline would merge a U.S. carrier's hub and spoke system operating in the U.S.,
with a European country's hub.and spoke system. The hypothetical integrated airline also
would be able to operate in the U.S. domestic market by virtue of its identity with the U.S.
carrier and within any EEC cabotage markets by virtue of its identity with the European
carrier. Foreign ownership of domestic air carriers, as illustrated above, is a way around
U.S., and potentially EEC, cabotage.
Open Skies was a major factor in the DOT approval of service integration between
Northwest Airlines and KLM.282 The new relationship between KLM and Northwest gives
travelers on the integrated airlines access to many more U.S. destinations than KLM alone
could reach. Travelers arriving from points outside the U.S. on KLM will be able to transfer
easily into a hub and spoke network operated by Northwest Airlines.28 3 The
KLM/Northwest network will be able to reach many more U.S. destinations than will other
foreign carriers, who have to do so directly from points outside the United States. Northwest
Airlines will benefit from its access to KLM's hub in Amsterdam.
279. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (describing unification of the EEC aviation market).
280. See generally Platt, supra note 64, at 198 (concluding that the U.S. will probably have to forgo intra-
U.S. cabotage to avoid being excluded from intra-EEC air transport).
281. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (describing Contracting Party remedies in case it is not
satisfied with the national ownership and control of a foreign carrier).
282. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (describing the DOT approval of the KLM/Northwest
integration).
283. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (describing the operation of hub and spoke networks).
An unanswered question is whether passengers or cargo will be required to actually physically move from a
Dutch-controlled KLM/lNorthwest airplane to an American-controlled one.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Comment describes the dynamics of the last forty years which have created the
present BATA system and analyzes and compares the various provisions of the Open Skies
accord in an historical context. While a vast network of BATAs regulate international civil
aviation, only several BATAs have had additional significance as influential models. The
Open Skies accord between the U.S. and the Netherlands represents what the U.S. desires
the next model to be. Its significance in the U.S.-European aviation market will depend upon
its interrelationship with an eventually unified EEC market. Thus, the full effects of Open
Skies in the U.S.-Netherlands market, and in the context of U.S. aviation relations with the
EEC, remain to be seen.
James H. Cordes

